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In order to improve the key rate of the decoy-state method, we need to jointly study yields of
different bases. Given the delicate fact that pulses of the same preparation state can have different
counting rates if they are measured in different bases, for example, those vacuum pulses and those
single-photon pulses, existing results of decoy-state quantum key distribution using biased bases are
actually flawed by assuming that they are equal. We fix this flaw through using the idea that yields
of pulses prepared in different bases are same provided that they are prepared in the same state
and also they are measured in the same basis, for example, those single-photon pulses prepared
in different bases but measured in the same basis. Based on this, we present correct formulas
for the decoy-state method using biased bases. Taking the effects of statistical fluctuations into
account, we then numerically study the key rates of different protocols with all parameters being
fully optimized. Our result confirms the prior art conclusion that decoy-state method using biased
bases can have advantage to the symmetric protocol with unbiased bases. We obtain high key rates
of our 4-intensity protocol (two in X bases and two in Z bases) without using any vacuum source.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most successful applications of quantum information processing.
It can help two remote parties, commonly noted as Alice and Bob, to set up the unconditionally secure key. The
security of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of quantum physics [1, 2], rather than unproven of computational
complexity assumptions.
In practice, imperfect single-photon sources are used in most of the real setups of QKD [1–3]. Such implementations,
in principle, suffer from the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [4, 5]. The decoy-state method [6–16] and some
other methods [17–19] can be used for unconditionally secure QKD even if Alice only uses the imperfect sources [4, 5].
The central issue in the decoy-state method is to faithfully estimate the yield of single-photon pulses. If we do
this estimation in each bases separately, i.e., only use those observed outcome of pulses prepared and measured in
the same basis, we can obtain two different values of yields, one for the X basis, one for the Z basis. In such a way,
results will be faithful but the key rate are not optimized. We can improve the key rate by using the observed results
in different bases jointly, however, there are delicate points we must pay attention to.
In fact, pulses of the same preparation state can have different counting rates if they are measured in different
bases, for example, those vacuum pulses and those single-photon pulses. This point is not considered in all previous
biased-basis methods [20–22]. In this paper, we point out that yields of pulses prepared in different bases are same if
they are prepared in the same state and measured in the same basis, for example, those single-photon pulses. This
is to say, we can treat those measurement outcome from different preparation bases jointly provided that they are
measured in the same basis. Based on this, we present correct formulas for the decoy-state method using biased bases.
We also consider the effects of statistical fluctuations.
In order to make a good estimation of the final key rate with the decoy-state methods, we need to find out the
lower and upper bounds of the yield s0 caused by the vacuum state first. These bounds can be easily obtained if we
assume that Alice can prepare a vacuum source. However, in practice, the different intensities are usually generated
with an intensity modulator, which has a finite extinction ratio. So it is usually difficult to create a perfect vacuum
state in decoy-state QKD experiments [14]. In this paper, we also make a study on the decoy-state method without
using vacuum. This is particularly important for the practical implementations.
Regarding the yield s0 of the vacuum state as a common variable, the final key rate is a function of s0. There is
a possible region for this values. To extract the final secret key, we should find out the worst-case key rate over the
whole region of s0 values. While in some previous works [21, 22], they straightly use the lower bound of s0 to calculate
the final key rate. Actually, in some cases shown in Sec. III, we find that the smallest value of the final key rate does
not appear with the lower bound of s0. In this case, if we simple mindedly calculate the final key rate with the lower
bound of s0, the security of the decoy-state method will not be guaranteed.
2The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we review some delicate points of the decoy-state method.
Subsequently, we show the correct formulas to estimate the lower bound of s1 and the upper bound of e1 with the
effect of statistical fluctuations being taken into account. After that, in Sec. III, we numerically study the optimized
key rates of different protocols. The article is ended in Sec. IV with a concluding remark.
II. SOME DELICATE POINTS OF THE DECOY-STATE METHOD AND THE CORRECT FORMULAS
Consider the case we use two bases for state preparation and measurement, the Z basis and the X basis. We denote
sω1,α for the yield of those single-photon pulses which are prepared in the α basis and measured in the ω basis. Note
that the state of single-photon pulses prepared in the Z basis is same with state of single-photon pulses prepared in
the X basis. The density matrix of both states are simply I/2. We also denote sω0 as the yield of those vacuum pulses
which are measured in the ω basis. The delicate point is that even in the asymptotic case
sZ0 6= sX0 , (1)
and
sZ1,α 6= sX1,β . (2)
These are different from the assumptions in prior art works such as [21] where one simply chose to do the decoy-state
analysis only in Z basis and then just used the value of sZ1,Z for the value s
X
1,X . The reason s
Z
1,Z 6= sX1,X is simply
due to the mismatch of detection efficiencies and dark counts in different bases. Such mismatch can come from either
imperfect control two the devices inside Labs, or Eve’s attack [23–26]. If we do the decoy-state study in each basis
separately with unbiased bases, we can obtain the lower bound values in each bases separately for sZ1,Z and s
X
1,X . The
results are faithful but the key rate will be low. Note that here we must use sZ0 and s
X
0 separately in calculating s
Z
1,Z
and sX1,X .
Here we have a better treatment and we can still study the decoy-state method jointly in different bases. For this
goal, we shall use the observed number of counts of pulses prepared in one basis but measured in another basis. In
particular, we have the following elementary equalities
sZ1,Z = s
Z
1,X , (3)
and
sX1,Z = s
X
1,X . (4)
Here, sω1,α(α, ω = Z,X) is the yield of those single-photon pulses which are prepared in the α basis and measured in
the ω basis. Eqs. (3, 4) are the main idea of this paper. Given these equations, we don’t have to study the decoy-state
method completely separately in each bases. For example, consider a protocol using a vacuum source O, one source
X1 in the X basis and two sources {Zj |j = 1, 2} in the Z basis. Observing SωO and {SωZj |j = 1, 2} we can formulate
the yield of single-photon pulses measured in the Z basis and also the yield of single-photon pulses measured in the X
basis. Here SωO is the yield of the vacuum source measured in the ω basis and S
ω
Zj
is the yield of source Zj measured
in the ω basis. Using the observed values {SωZj |j = 1, 2} and SωO. Asymptotically we have
sω1,Z ≥ sω,L1,Z =
a2,Z2S
ω
Z1
− a2,Z1SωZ2 −A
0,2
Z1,Z2
SωO
A1,2Z1,Z2
, (5)
where A0,2Z1,Z2 = a0,Z1a2,Z2 − a0,Z2a2,Z1 , A
1,2
Z1,Z2
= a1,Z1a2,Z2 − a1,Z2a2,Z1 and ak,Zj are non-negative parameters
of sources Zj with ρZk =
∑
k ak,Zj |k〉〈k|. Here ω can take both X and Z. Given Eqs. (3, 4), the error rate of
single-photon pulses prepared and measured in the X basis is
eX1 ≤ eX,U1 =
TXX1 − a0,X1sX0 /2
a1,X1s
X,L
1,X
=
TXX1 − a0,X1SXO /2
a1,X1s
X,L
1,Z
, (6)
where TXX1 are error yield of the source X1 measured in the X basis, ak,X1 are non-negative parameters of source X1
with ρX1 =
∑
k ak,X1 |k〉〈k| and the lower bound sX,L1,Z is given by Eq. (5) already. Note that our formulas Eqs. (5,
36) are unconditionally correct under whatever situation, e.g., detection efficiency mismatch, no matter it comes from
the imperfect control in side Lab. or Eve.’s attack outside Lab [23–26].
Most generally, Alice can use several different sources. We assume Alice prepares the vacuum source O, 2 non-
vacuum sources in the Z basis, Z1, Z2 and 2 different non-vacuum sources in the X basis X1, X2 with probabilities
pO, pZ1 , pZ2 and pX1 , pX2 ,respectively. The density matrices of these non-vacuum sources in photon number space
are denoted as follows
ραl =
∑
k
ak,αj |k〉〈k|, (7)
where ak,αl are non-negative parameters and α can be the Z and X bases. Meanwhile, we introduce the following
very important conditions for two different sources α1 and α2
ak,α2
ak,α1
≥ a1,α2
a1,α1
≥ a0,α2
a0,α1
, (8)
for all k ≥ 2. We denote α1 ≺ α2 when the sources α1 and α2 fulfill the relations presented in Eq.(8). Imperfect
sources used in practice such as the coherent state source, the heralded source out of the parametric-down conversion,
satisfy the above conditions.
In the protocol, we also assume that Bob measures the received pulses in the Z and X bases with probabilities
qZ and qX respectively. After the preparation and measurement of Nt pulses, Alice and Bob obtain the observable
Nωαj and M
ω
αj
which are the number of successful counts and error counts when Alice sends the pulses from source
αj and Bob measures them in the ω basis (when preparation basis and measured basis are different, we do not need
error counts). Here α and ω can take both X and Z. We also denote Sωαj and T
ω
αj
as the yield and error yield
respectively with Sωαj = N
ω
αj
/(pαjq
ωNt) and T
ω
αj
= Mωαj/(pαjq
ωNt). As shown, we have the normalized relations
pO +
∑2
l=1 pZl +
∑2
r=1 pXr = 1 and q
X + qZ = 1.
Following the GLLP security analysis [3], the final key rate for the source ρZl is given by
R = pZlq
Z
{
a1,Zls
Z
1 [1−H(ep,Z1 )]− feSZZlH(EZZl)
}
, (9)
if the source is not used for error test. Here pZlq
Z is the raw data sift factor, including the basis-sift factor qZ and
the signal-state ratio pZl ; s
Z
1 and e
p,Z
1 are the yield and phase error rate of the single-photon state measured in the
Z basis; fe is the efficiency factor of the error-correction method used; SZl and EZl are the yield and quantum bit
error rate of the source Zl measured in the Z basis; H(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary Shannon
entropy function. The phase error rate ep,Z1 can be estimated from the error rate in the X basis while it can not be
measured directly.
In any real experiment, the total pulses sent by Alice is finite. In order to extract the secret final key, we have
to consider the effect of statistical fluctuations caused by the finite-size. In this case, yields of the same state out of
different sources are not always rigorously equal to each other, i.e. sωk,α1 6= sωk,α2 . Here sωk,αj is the yield of k-photon
pulses prepared from source αj and measured in the ω basis. To obtain the lower bound of s
ω
1 , one can implement the
idea of Ref. [16], i.e. using the averaged yield of a specific state from different sources. As shown, one can introduce
the averaged value for the yield of k-photon pulses from all sources that are prepared in the same state and measured
in the same basis. We define
〈sωk,α〉 =
1
cωk
∑
l
pZlak,Zls
ω
k,Zl
+
1
cωk
∑
r
pXrak,Xrs
ω
k,Xr
, (k = 0, 1); (10)
〈sωk,α〉 =
1
cωk,α
∑
j
pαjak,αjs
ω
k,αj
, (k ≥ 2), (11)
where cωk =
∑
l pZlak,Zl +
∑
r pXrak,Xr (k = 0, 1) and c
ω
k,α =
∑
j pαjak,αj (k ≥ 2). With Eq. (10), we have 〈sωk,X〉 =
〈sωk,Z〉 for k = 0, 1. Therefore we shall omit subscript α there for k = 0, 1 and use notations 〈sω0 〉, 〈sω1 〉 for 〈sω0,α〉, 〈sω1,α〉
for simplicity. Also, we define quantity
〈Sωαl〉 =
∞∑
k=0
ak,αl〈sωk,α〉. (12)
4Considering the relations in Eq. (12) prepared in the α basis and measured in the ω basis, we can lower bound
〈sω1,α〉 for a given value of 〈sω0 〉 with the following equations [15]
〈sω1,α〉 ≥ 〈sω,L1 〉 = max
α=Z,X
[
〈sω,L1,α 〉(〈sω0 〉)
]
(13)
and
〈sω,L1,α 〉(〈sω0 〉) =
a2,α2S
ω
α1
− a2,α1S
ω
α2
−A0,2α1α2〈sω0 〉
A1,2α1α2
, (14)
where A0,2α1α2 = a0,α1a2,α2 − a0,α2a2,α1 , A1,2α1α2 = a1,α1a2,α2 − a1,α2a2,α1 and
Sωαj = S
ω
αj
/(1 + δωαj ), S
ω
αj
= Sωαj/(1− δωαj ). (15)
By using the multiplicative form of Chernoff bound [27, 28], with a fixed failure probability ǫ, we can give an interval
of 〈Sωαj 〉 with the observable Sωαj , [Sωαj , S
ω
αj
], which can bound the value of 〈Sωαj 〉 with a probability at least 1 − ǫ.
Similarly, we can also define T
ω
ωj
with the observable Tωωj . Note that 〈sω,L1 〉 is actually a function of 〈sω0 〉.
With the mean values 〈sω,L1 〉 defined in Eq. (13), the lower bounds of sZ1,Zl and sX1,Xr can be estimated by
sZ,L1,Zl = 〈s
Z,L
1 〉(1− δZl), sX,L1,Xr = 〈s
X,L
1 〉(1− δXr ), (16)
where δZl = λ/
√
NZ1,Zl〈s
Z,L
1,Z 〉 with λ =
√−2 ln ǫ and δXr = λ/
√
NX1,Xr 〈s
X,L
1,X 〉. Here and after, we define
Nωk,αj = ak,αjpαjq
ωNt, (17)
as the number of k-photon pulses prepared in source αj and measured in the basis ω.
In order to estimate the final key rate, we also need the upper bound of the error rate eX1 . Similarly, we have
eX1,X1 ≤ eX,U1,X1 =
TXX1 − a0,X1〈sX0 〉(1 − δX0,X1)/2
a1,X1s
X,L
1,X1
, (18)
where δX0,X1 = λ/
√
NX0,X1〈sX0 〉.
If the key size is infinite, the phase-flip error rate for single-photon counts in Z basis is simply ep,Z1 = e
X
1 . In a finite-
key-size case, we can apply the large data size approximation of the random sampling method [30] to upper bound
the phase error rate ep,Z1 of single-photon pulses prepared and measured in the Z basis with the failure probability ǫ
ep,Z1 ≤ ep,Z,U1 = eX,U1,X1 + θXZ , (19)
where θXZ =
√
nθ/dθ with dθ =
(1−gX)gX ln 2
2(1−e1)e1
, nθ = − log[ǫ
√
e1(1− e1)nXnZ/(nX + nZ)]/(nX+nZ) and gX = nXnX+nZ .
Here we write nX = N
X
1,X1
, nZ =
∑
lN
Z
1,Zl
and e1 = e
X,U
1,X1
for simplicity. Note that ep,Z,U1 is a function of 〈sX0 〉.
Straightly, we can also formulate the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate of single-photon counts in X basis,
being denoted by ep,X,U1 . We omit the explicit formula here since it is just trivially written analogically to Eq.(19).
Note that 〈sX0 〉 (or 〈sZ0 〉) is the common variable in both quantity 〈sX,L1 〉 and ep,Z,U1 (or quantity 〈sZ,L1 〉 and ep,X,U1 )
shown in Eq.(13) and Eq.(19) respectively. We need to know the range of this for final key calculation.
If Alice uses a vacuum source in the protocol, the bounds are simply
S
ω
O = 〈sω,U0 〉 ≥ 〈sω0 〉 ≥ 〈sω,L0 〉 = SωO. (20)
However, in practice, it is usually difficult to create a perfect vacuum state in decoy-state QKD experiments [14].
We may consider the decoy-state methods without using a vacuum source. In the method, Eq.(20) can not be used
directly.
Reconsidering the relations in Eq. (12) with j = 1, 2, we can lower bound 〈sω0 〉 by eliminating 〈sω1,α〉
〈sω0 〉 ≥ 〈sω,L0 〉(α) =
a1,α2S
ω
α1
− a1,α1S
ω
α2
A0,1α1α2
, (21)
5where A0,1α1α2 = a0,α1a1,α2 − a0,α2a1,α1 . With these preparations, in the method without the assumption of vacuum,
we can write the lower bound of 〈sω0 〉 as
〈sω0 〉 ≥ 〈sω,L0 〉 = max
α=X,Z
{
〈sω,L0 (α)〉, 0
}
. (22)
By simply attributing all the errors to the vacuum pulses, we can upper bound 〈sω0 〉 with
〈sω0 〉 ≤ 〈sω,U0 〉 = min
{
2T
ω
ω1
/a0,ω1, S
ω
Z1
/a0,Z1 , S
ω
X1
/a0,X1
}
. (23)
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
A. Some special protocols
Choosing different number of sources in the X and Z bases, we list some protocols in Tab. I.
Protocol Description
3Int-0 O,Z1, Z2, X1, X2; Zj = Xj , pZj = pXj , q
Z = qX .
3Int-1 O,Z1, Z2, X1; Z1 = X1, Z1 ≺ Z2, µZ2 = 0.479.
4Int-1 O,Z1, Z2, X1; Z1 ≺ Z2.
4Int-2 Z1, Z2, X1, X2; Z1 ≺ Z2, X1 ≺ X2.
5Int-1 O,Z1, Z2, X1, X2; Z1 ≺ Z2, X1 ≺ X2.
TABLE I: List of some practical decoy-state methods. O is the vacuum source. Zl and Xr are the sources used by Alice in
the Z and X bases respectively. The sources are different from each other except when we write the equivalent relations in
the table, such as Zj = Xj . The probabilities of choosing the sources are independent except for the normalized condition. In
3Int-0, we also assume Z1 ≺ Z2.
The first three-intensity protocol 3Int-0 listed in the table is the original symmetric method discussed in Ref. [14].
In 3Int-0, Alice uses the vacuum source and two different non-vacuum sources in the Z and X bases to prepare the
pulses. The symmetric conditions can be described by Zj = Xj , pZj = pXj for j = 1, 2 and q
Z = qX with the
notations presented in this paper. In order to estimate the lower bound of the yield of single-photon pulses, we also
need to assume Z1 ≺ Z2 which indicates that the sources Z1 and Z2 fulfill the relations presented in Eq.(8) with
σ1 = Z1 and σ2 = Z2.
The second three-intensity protocol 3Int-1 listed in Tab. I is the method considered in Ref. [21]. This is then further
studied in Ref. [22] with one more free intensity while the security loopholes as discussed earlier in this paper is still
there and the key rate is not really fully optimized. In 3Int-1, Alice uses the vacuum source, two different sources
Z1, Z2 in the Z basis and only one source X1 in the X basis. The intensities of the source in the X basis is equal to
the first one in the Z basis, i.e. Z1 = X1. Furthermore, the intensity (weak coherent state used in the simulation) of
the second source in the Z basis is 0.479.
In Tab. I, we also list two different four-intensity protocols. The second one, 4Int-2, is a new general protocol
without the assumption of vacuum, whereas the vacuum source are used in the protocol 4Int-1. Taking the protocol
4Int-2 as an example, Alice uses two different sources in the Z and X bases respectively. For these four different
sources, we assume Z1 ≺ Z2 and X1 ≺ X2. In this protocol, we use sources Z2 and X2 to extract the final key.
With Eq.(16), the lower bounds of sZ1,Zl and s
X
1,Xr
can be estimated. The upper bound of ep,Z1 can be calculated with
Eq.(19). The upper bound of ep,X1 can also be estimated in the same way. In 4Int-1, the sources Z2 and Z1 are used
to extract the final key.
Besides these three-intensity and four-intensity protocols, we list a five-intensity protocol 5Int-1 in Tab. I. In 5Int-1,
Alice uses the vacuum source, two different sources in the Z and X bases to prepare the pulses. In order to make
5Int-1 contains 4Int-1 and 4Int-2 as its special cases, we need to introduce a probability psZ1 with 0 ≤ psZ1 ≤ pZ1 .
With probability psZ1 , Alice will randomly choose pules from Z1 to extract the final key.
To maximize the key rates, in 3Int-1 and 4Int-1, we shall use the following economic worst-case estimation formula
R = min
〈sX
0
〉
[
R
(〈sX0 〉
)]
(24)
6over the region for all possible values of 〈sX0 〉 in [〈sX,L0 〉, 〈sX,U0 〉]. Here function R is R = R1 + R2 and
Rl = pZlq
Z
{
a1,Zls
Z,L
1,Zl
[1−H(ep,Z,U1 )]− feSZZlH(EZZl)
}
. (25)
While in the 3Int-0, 4Int-2 and 5Int-1, we use the following economic more worst-case estimation for key rates
R = min
〈sZ
0
〉,〈sX
0
〉
[
R
(〈sZ0 〉, 〈sX0 〉
)]
(26)
over the region for all possible values of 〈sZ0 〉 and 〈sX0 〉 in [〈sZ,L0 〉, 〈sZ,U0 〉] and [〈sX,L0 〉, 〈sX,U0 〉] respectively. Here
R(〈sX0 〉, 〈sZ0 〉) = RX +RZ (27)
and
RZ = pZ2q
Z
{
a1,Z2s
Z,L
1,Z2
[1−H(ep,Z,U1 )]− feSZZ2H(EZZ2 )
}
, (28)
RX = pX2q
X
{
a1,X2s
X,L
1,X2
[1−H(ep,Z,U1 )]− feSXX2H(EXX2)
}
. (29)
Note that in such a case, we need to calculate the final key rate with two variables, 〈sZ0 〉 and 〈sX0 〉 jointly. If not using
this trick, the simple worst-case treatment that treats each one separately will produce a lower key rate.
In subsection III B, we will compare the results for these protocols with the full parameters optimization. After
that, we will see that the final key rates obtained with 4Int-2 and 5Int-1 are nearly equal to each other. That is to
say, it is advantageous to use the general protocol 4Int-2 in practice, as it can give an almost optimal key rate and
has no use for the vacuum source.
B. Numerical results
In this subsection, we will present some results of the numerical simulation. We also optimize all parameters by the
method of full optimization. For a fair comparison, we use all the sifted key corresponding to the successful events
obtained with X and Z bases to extract the final key. We shall estimate what values would be observed for the
yields and error yields in the normal cases by the linear channel loss model shown in appendix A. We use the same
experimental parameters used in Ref.[29] for our numerical simulation, which are also used for simulation in Ref.[21].
The values of these parameters are listed in Table II. In the simulation, we also assume that Alice uses the coherent
states to prepare the pulses. Then the yields Sωαj and error yields T
ω
αj
can be calculated with different intensities.
By using these values, we can estimate the lower bound of sZ1,Zl(s
X
1,Xr
) and the upper bound of ep,Z1 (e
p,X
1 ) with the
method presented in Sec. II.
ed pd ηd fe ǫ α
3.3% 1.7 × 10−6 4.5% 1.16 10−10 0.2
TABLE II: List of experimental parameters used in numerical simulations. ed: the misalignment-error probability, pd: the
background counting rate, ηd: the detector efficiency, fe: the error correction inefficiency, ǫ: the security bound considered in
the finite-data analysis, i.e., failure probability, α: the loss coefficient of the standard fiber measured in dB/km.
To make a fair comparison, we make the full parameter optimization for all protocols. Here we also use the well-
known local search algorithm [31]. In this algorithm, we need to optimize the one-variable nonlinear function in
each step for the local search. In the optimization, except for those bits for error test, all bits are used for final key
distillation. In particular, for protocols 3Int-1, 4Int-1, all bits due to sources Z1, Z2 are used for final key distillation;
while in protocols 3Int-0, 4Int-2, bits due to sources Z2, X2 are used for final key distillation. In order to make the
protocol 5Int-1 contains 4Int-1 and 4Int-2 as its special cases, besides bits due to sources Z2, X2 being used for final
key distillation, we also need to split the bits due to source Z1 into two parts (one for error test and the other for
final key distillation) by introducing a probability psZ1 with 0 ≤ psZ1 ≤ pZ1 .
We consider the different methods in the case of data-size Nt = 10
10. The optimal key rates of per pulse for
the distances 80km, 90km, 100km 110km and 120km (standard fiber), with the statistical fluctuations, are shown
in Table III. Comparing the results with the original symmetric protocol 3Int-0 and the biased-basis protocol 3Int-1
discussed in Ref. [21], the achievable key rate can be significantly improved with our new protocols.
780km 90km 100km 110km 120km
3Int-0 3.37e-5 1.73e-5 7.65e-6 2.39e-6 3.91e-8
3Int-1 5.04e-5 2.38e-5 9.29e-6 2.02e-6 0
4Int-1 5.43e-5 2.65e-5 1.09e-5 2.99e-6 3.65e-8
4Int-2 5.05e-5 2.39e-5 9.63e-6 3.50e-6 4.55e-7
5Int-1 5.43e-5 2.65e-5 1.09e-5 3.50e-6 4.55e-7
TABLE III: Comparison of the optimal final key rates at different distances (standard fiber) with statistical fluctuation analysis
in the case of data-size Nt = 10
10(total number of pulses). Results for methods in Tab. I are listed here. Comparing with the
results obtained with the original symmetric protocol 3Int-0 and the biased-basis protocol 3Int-1 presented in Ref. [21], our
protocols can significantly improve the the key rates. The key rate of our 4Int-2 protocol which does not use vacuum is very
close to that of the 5Int protocol. Interestingly, the 5Int protocol automatically comes to one of the 4-intensity protocol at each
distances. This strongly indicates that we have indeed reached the key rate maximization. This also shows that, for a given
distance, instead of using the 5 intensity protocol, just choosing one of the 4 intensities is enough.
In Tab. IV, we list the value of parameters with all of them being optimized. In the 1st column, we show the
parameters for the original symmetric protocol 3Int-0. In the 2nd column, the parameters for the 4-intensity protocol
4Int-1 are listed. In the last column, we exhibit the parameters for our new 4-intensity protocol 4Int-2.
3Int-0 4Int-1 4Int-2
pZ2 = pX2 = 0.338 pZ2 = 0.597 pZ2 = 0.260
pZ1 = pX1 = 0.142 pZ1 = 0.190 pZ1 = 0.077
pO = 0.040 pX1 = 0.112 pX2 = 0.458
pO = 0.101 pX1 = 0.205
µZ2 = µX2 = 0.390 µZ2 = 0.379 µZ2 = 0.419
µZ1 = µX1 = 0.116 µZ1 = 0.078 µZ1 = 0.200
µO = 0 µX1 = 0.255 µX2 = 0.396
µO = 0 µX1 = 0.073
qX = 0.5 qX = 0.223 qX = 0.579
TABLE IV: Comparison of parameters for the distance 110km (standard fiber) with statistical fluctuation analysis in the case
of data-size Nt = 10
10 for different protocols. In the 1st, 2nd and 3rd columns we list the value of parameters with all of them
being optimized for 3Int-0, 4Int-1 and 4Int-2 respectively. pαj is the probability to use the source αj in the protocol. pO is
the probability to choose the vacuum source. µαj is the intensity of the coherent source αj . q
X is the probability that Bob
measures the received pulses in the X basis.
More extensive results are shown in Fig. 1. In this figure, we show the optimal key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic
scale as a function of the distance under a practical setting with finite data-set Nt = 10
10. In Fig. 1, we use the thin
magenta dash-dot line, the thin black solid line, the blue dashed line, the red solid line and the green dash-dot line
to indicate the results obtained with the protocols 3Int-0, 3Int-1, 4Int-1, 4Int-2 and 5Int-1 respectively. From the
numerical simulation, we can conclude that both the achievable key rate and distance can be significantly improved
by using our new protocols compared with 3Int-0 and 3Int-1. The optimal final key rates obtained by using the
four-intensity protocol 4Int-2 and the five-intensity protocol 5Int-1 are nearly equal to each other. In practical QKD
applications, for better performance in terms of key rate and distance, it is advantageous to make use of 4Int-2 with
full parameter optimization, because of the advantage of not using any vacuum source.
As discussed in Sec. II, in order to estimate the final secure key rate, we need to find out the smallest one with
variable 〈sX0 〉 changing in the region [〈sX,L0 〉, 〈sX,U0 〉]. Previously, in Refs. [20, 21], they straightly use the lower bound
〈sX,L0 〉 to calculate the final key rate. In order to insure the security, we must make sure that the smallest key rate
value just happened at the lower bound value of 〈sX0 〉 when we use it to calculate the final key rate directly. However,
in the numerical simulation, we find some counterexamples. In Fig. 2, after evaluating 〈sZ0 〉 with its proper value
〈s˜Z0 〉, we plot the key rate R as a function of 〈sX0 〉 with 〈sX0 〉 ∈ [〈sX,L0 〉, 〈sX,U0 〉] for the protocol 4Int-2 at the distance
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Optimal secure key rates (per pulse) in logarithmic scale as as a function of the distance under different
protocols. Here we set Nt = 10
10. The key rates are obtained by using numerical methods with 3Int-0 (thin magenta dash-dot
line), 3Int-1 (thin black solid line), 4Int-1 (blue dashed line), 4Int-2 (red solid line) and 5Int-1 (green dash-dot line). The key
rates with four-intensity protocol 4Int-2 and five-intensity protocol 5Int-1 are almost overlapped. In simulation, we perform a
full parameter optimization for all cases.
of 100km. From this figure, we can see that the smallest value of R(〈sX0 〉) = R(〈sX0 〉, 〈s˜Z0 〉) does not obtained with
〈sX0 〉 = 〈sX,L0 〉. In this case, we can not calculate the final key rate with 〈sX,L0 〉 directly. That is to say, if we use the
lower bound of the yield of vacuum state to calculate the final key rate in this counterexample, the security will not
be guaranteed.
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The key rate R(〈sX0 〉) = R(〈s
X
0 〉, 〈s˜
Z
0 〉) vs the yield of vacuum state as the variable and 〈s
X
0 〉 ∈
[〈sX,L
0
〉, 〈sX,U
0
〉] with 4Int-2 for the distance 100km (standard fiber). From this figure, we can see that the smallest values of R
is not obtained at the lower bounds of 〈sX0 〉.
IV. CONCLUSION
We propose to make use of the yields of those pulse which are prepared in one basis and measured in another basis.
This is to say, we can treat those measurement outcome from different preparation bases jointly provided that they are
measured in the same basis. Based on this, we present correct formulas for the decoy-state method with considering
the effects of statistical fluctuations.
In practice, it is usually difficult to create a perfect vacuum state in decoy-state QKD experiments. In this paper,
we also present an analytical approach with general decoy states, i.e. without the assumption of vacuum. By taking
the full parameter optimization with the linear channel loss model, we find that our new 4-intensity protocol 4Int-2
can give an almost optimal key rate. The vacuum source and more decoy states cannot help to increase the key rate.
In the simulation, we find some counterexamples in which the lower bound of the final key rate does not obtained
with the lower bound of the yield of the vacuum state. That is to say, if we use the lower bound of the yield of the
vacuum state to calculate the final key rate directly in the counterexample, the security will not be guaranteed. So
we need to find out the smallest key rate with different values of the yield of the vacuum state faithfully.
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Appendix A: Linear Channel Loss Model
In order to do the numerical simulations, we need the observed yields and error yields. Here we consider a widely
used linear channel loss model [8]. With this model, the yields and error yields can be simulated. In this model, Alice
randomly chooses the states for different sources with corresponding probabilities.
For this model, we define ηω as the overall transmission of the channel when Bob measures the pulses in the ω
basis (ω = X,Z). It should be note that ηω includes the detector efficiency and is measured in dB. In the real setups,
such as in the situation with different detector efficiencies, the transmissions ηX and ηZ are not equal to each other
rigorously. So we should treat the yields separately with different bases used by Bob to measure the pulses.
It is reasonable to assume independent between the behaviors of the k photons in a k-photon state. Therefore the
transmittance of the k-photon state ηωk is given by
ηωk = 1− (1− ηω)k, (k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ) (A1)
when Bob measures the pulses in the ω basis.
Define sωk,α to be the yield of an k-photon state when Alice prepares the state in the α basis and Bob measures in
the ω basis (ω, α = X,Z). Specially, sω0,α is the background rate. It should be note that s
ω
0,α is independent of the α
basis used by Alice to prepare the pulses. Then we can write sω0,α into s
ω
0 concisely.
As discussed above, we need to treat sωk,α with ω = X and ω = Z separately. In the protocol, there are two detectors
are used when Bob chooses the ω basis to measure the pulses. Furthermore, Bob denote the situation when one and
only detector makes a count as a successful event. The yield of an k-photon state, sωk,α, mainly comes from two parts,
background and true signal. Assuming that the background counts are independent of the signal photon detection,
then sωk,α is given by
sωk,α = (1− sω0 )[1 − (1− 2sω0 )(1 − ηω)k], (A2)
when Alice and Bob choose the same bases, i.e. ω = α. Furthermore, we have
sωk,α = 2(1− sω0 )[(1− ηω/2)k − (1− sω0 )(1 − ηω)k], (A3)
when the bases used by Alice and Bob are different, i.e. ω 6= α.
In the ideal case without misalignment error, the error rate of the k-photon state when Alice and Bob use the same
bases, eˆωk,ω, is given by
eˆωk,ω = s
ω
0 (1 − sω0 )(1− ηω)k. (A4)
In the real setups, we denote ed as the misalignment error probability. Then the error rate of the k-photon state is
eωk,ω = ed(1− 2eˆωk,ω) + eˆωk,ω . (A5)
With these notations, we can write the yields of the pulses prepared from source αj and measured in the ω basis as
Sωαj =
∑
k
ak,αjs
ω
k,α, (A6)
where the density matrix of source αj given by Eq.(7) has been used. The error yield is given by
Tωαj = E
ω
αj
Sωαj = [ed(1 − 2Eˆωαj ) + Eˆωαj ]Sωαj , (A7)
when ω = α with Eˆωωj =
∑
k ak,ωje
ω
k,ω . Furthermore, the error rate of the k-photon state is always equal to 1/2 when
Alice and Bob use the different bases.
If we consider the weak coherent sources, assuming that the phase of each pulse is totally randomized, the density
matrix of the coherent state with intensity µ can be written as
ρ =
∑
k
e−µµk
k!
|k〉〈k|.
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With this formula, the yield of the pulses prepared from the weak coherent source αj with density µαj and measured
in the ω basis is
Sωαj = (1− sω0 )[1 − (1− 2sω0 )e−µαj η
ω
], (A8)
when ω = α and
Sωαj = 2(1− sω0 )e−
µαj
ηω
2 [1− (1− sω0 )e−
µαj
ηω
2 ], (A9)
when ω 6= α. The error yield can be simulated by Eq.(A7) when α = ω with Eˆωωj = sω0 (1− sω0 )e−µωj η
ω
.
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